Original language
English
Country
United States of America
Date of text
Status
Unknown
Type of court
National - lower court
Sources
Court name
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Reference number
C06-05755
Files
Justice(s)
Jenkins, M.
Abstract
This case represents California's effort to hold automakers accountable for climate change. The State of California brought two causes of action against various automakers for creating, contributing to, and maintaining global warming. Causes of action for (1) public nuisance under federal common law, and (2) public nuisance under California law were alleged. Arguing that the State had improperly attempted to create a new global warming tort with no legitimate origins in federal or state law, defendants moved to dismiss the two claims as non-justiciable political questions, for failure to state a claim under federal or California law, and as preempted by federal law.
The court discussed six "formulations" that indicate the existence of a non-justiciable political question in light of the Constitutional doctrine of separation of powers: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; and (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
The court concluded that precedent affirmed that in order to resolve typical air pollution cases, courts must strike a balance between interests seeking strict schemes to reduce pollution rapidly to eliminate its social costs and interests advancing the economic concern that strict schemes will retard industrial development with attendant social costs. Balancing these interests, along with other interests involved, was impossible without an "initial policy determination" first having been made by Congress and the President.
Because a comprehensive global warming solution must be achieved by a broad array of domestic and international measures that are yet undefined, it would be premature and inappropriate for the court to make such a determination as the State asked before the elected branches did so.
The court concluded that the State's claim implicated a textually demonstrable Constitutional commitment to the political branches.The State argued that its environmental nuisance claim was committed to the federal judiciary and had no import on interstate commerce or foreign policy. Rejecting the State's argument, the court reasoned that recognizing such a new and unprecedented federal common law nuisance claim for damages would likely have commerce implications in other states, potentially exposing various entities to damages for doing nothing more than lawfully engaging in their respective spheres of commerce. Furthermore, awarding the State damages here would punish defendants for lawfully selling their automobiles both in California and abroad. Finally, there was a lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards by which to resolve the State's claim. The court found itself lacking guidance to determine what was an unreasonable contribution to the sum of carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere, or who should bear costs associated with the global climate change that admittedly results from multiple sources around the globe.