Brad Bennett, et al., Petitioners v. Michael Spear et al.

This was a challenge to a biological opinion issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service in accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), concerning the operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project, and the project’s impact on two varieties of endangered fish. The question for decision was whether the petitioners, who had competing economic and other interests in Klamath Project water, had standing to seek judicial review of the biological opinion under the citizen suit provision of the ESA. ESA required the Secretary of the Interior to specify animal species that were “threatened" or "endangered" and designate their "critical habitat," and required federal agencies to ensure that any action they authorized was not likely to jeopardize a listed species or its critical habitat. If an agency determined that a proposed action could adversely affect such a species, it had to formally consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service, which had to provide it with Biological Opinion on the impacts of the action. If the Service concluded that such action would result in jeopardy or adverse habitat modification the Biological Opinion had to outline any "reasonable and prudent alternatives" that the Service believed would avoid that consequence. The Service issued a Biological Opinion, concluding that the proposed long term operation of the Klamath Irrigation Project was likely to jeopardize two endangered species of fish and identifying as a reasonable alternative the maintenance of minimum water levels on certain reservoirs. The petitioners in this case were irrigation districts receiving project water and operators of ranches in those districts. They filed this action against the Service, claiming, inter alia, that the jeopardy determination and imposition of minimum water levels constituted an implicit critical habitat determination for the species without considering the designation’s economic impact. The District Court dismissed the complaint, concluding that petitioners lacked standing because they asserted "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests" that did not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the ESA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the "zone of interests" test -which required that a plaintiff’s grievance arguably fell within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit- limited the class of persons who could obtain judicial review under the ESA’s citizen suit provision; and that only plaintiffs alleging an interest in the preservation of endangered species fell within the zone of interests protected by the ESA. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners had standing to seek judicial review of the Biological Opinion. It was of the view that the Court of Appeals had erred in concluding that the petitioners lacked standing under the zone of interests test to bring their claims under the ESA’s citizen suit provision. The test was a prudential standing requirement of general application that applied unless expressly negated by Congress. By providing that "any person may commence a civil suit," §1540(g)(1) ESA negated the test. The quoted phrase was an authorization of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress ordinarily used. The legislation’s overall subject matter was the environment and §1540(g)’s purpose was to encourage enforcement by so called "private attorneys general", so the term “any person” had to be taken at face value. There was no textual basis for saying that the formulation’s expansion of standing requirements applied to environmentalists alone. The petitioners’ complaint also alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to the Biological Opinion and redressable by a favorable judicial ruling and, thus, met standing requirements at this stage of the litigation. The claim that petitioners would suffer economic harm because of an erroneous jeopardy determination was plainly within the zone of interests protected by ESA. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.