Réal Veilleux and Rémi Veilleux, Appellants v. Commission de protection du territoire agricole du Québec, Respondent

The appellants alleged that they had acquired rights under s. 101 of the Act to Preserve Agricultural Land to use a lot for a purpose other than agriculture and in particular to alienate and subdivide the lot and build a house on it without authorization from the Commission de protection du territoire agricole. The lot in question had been subject to the provisions of the Act since 1980. On that date the stone foundations and wood flooring of a residence built in 1945 and demolished in 1976 still existed and were not "uncropped". On July 24, 1980, part of the lot, including the site of the old foundations, was sold. The purchaser thereupon sent the Commission a statement to the effect that he held acquired rights to build a house on this lot. Construction of the new residence began as soon as the municipality issued the building permit. In 1983, the Commission issued an order directing the appellants to vacate the sale and to cease using the lot for any purpose other than agriculture. The appellants filed a motion in the Superior Court seeking a ruling that they had acquired rights under s. 101 of the Act. The motion was granted but this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeal. This appeal was to determine whether the stone foundation of a house covered by wood flooring which was not "uncropped" on June 13, 1980 was a non-conforming use giving rise to an acquired right within the meaning of ss. 101 et seq. of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the appeal should be dismissed. The appellants relied on art. 406 C.C.L.C. and s. 6 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Both of these, while recognizing the fundamental nature of the right of ownership, made it subject to the limitations and prohibitions contained in statutes or regulations. The Act to preserve agricultural land contained a prohibition of a public nature. As the appellants’ lot was located in an agricultural region, they had to prove that it was in an exceptional situation covered by the Act. The Court was of the view that the appellants did not have acquired rights under s. 101. This provision protected the rights of those who were actually using their land for other than agricultural purposes at the time the Act became applicable to it. The owner of unused and deserted land did not have a non-conforming right of use to protect that would justify the exclusion of that land from the ambit of the Act. At the time of the decree, all he had was a right of ownership stripped of any right of use other than that allowed by the Act. In the case at bar, there is no question that in the past this lot was used for residential purposes; but this use was abandoned when the house was demolished in 1976. At the time of the decree, in 1980, no effective use was made of the lot or of the old foundations located on it. The appellants therefore could not rely on s. 101. Unused land was not used for purposes other than agriculture, as required by this provision.